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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we study the uncoordinated spectrum access
problem using the multi-player multi-armed bandits frame-
work. We consider a model where there is no central con-
trol and the users cannot communicate with each other. The
environment may appear differently to different users, i.e.,
the mean rewards as seen by different users for a particular
channel may be different. Additionally, in case of a collision,
we allow for the colliding users to receive non-zero rewards.
With this setup, we present a policy that achieves expected
regret of order O(log2+δ T ) for some δ > 0.
Index Terms— multi-armed bandits, uncoordinated spec-
trum access
1. INTRODUCTION
Multi-player multi-armed bandit models have been widely
used to study the spectrum access problem [1–9], where
there are multiple users vying for a set of channels. The
users follow a common protocol that is designed to max-
imise the system performance. While [6, 8, 9] focus on the
primary/secondary user paradigm for spectrum sharing, we
consider a different system model where there is no such
distinction between the users.
In most of the previous work in this area [1, 4, 6], it is
assumed that the reward distribution for each channel is the
same across all users. Given that in a practical scenario, users
are not colocated in a wireless network, assuming that users
have different reward distributions for the channels results
in a more realistic model. There has been some prior work
covering varying reward distributions across users [2, 3, 5].
The algorithm presented in [5] considers such a case with an
assumption that each player can observe what happens on a
channel, i.e., if the channel is free or if there is a collision on
it. However such an assumption is unrealistic for the uncoor-
dinated spectrum access problem. In our work, we consider
a fully distributed scenario where players have access only to
their previous actions and rewards. The work in [3] considers
such a setup and uses the method of forced collisions as a way
to communicate the estimated mean rewards between users in
order for them to compute the optimal matching. The work
in [2] also considers such a distributed setting where they use
a game-theoretic approach to solve this problem.
Another assumption prevalent in most previous works is
that in the case of a collision, all the colliding users get zero
reward. However, in the case of a collision in a practical sce-
nario, the colliding users would get a reduced reward. For
instance, if the rate of the channel is the quantity represented
by the rewards, when two users use the same channel they
would get reduced, but not necessarily zero rewards. In [1], a
model is studied which allows for more than one user to ac-
cess a channel simultaneously and receive non-zero rewards.
However, [1] assumes that the reward distributions for each
channel is the same across all users. In this paper, we con-
sider the case where the channels may appear differently to
the users and the colliding users can receive non-zero rewards.
We present an algorithm that achieves expected regret of order
O(log2 T ). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
that has considered the case of non-zero rewards on collisions
when the users can see the channels differently. Our work
is closest to [2] where they use a game theoretic approach to
maximise the sum of expected rewards of the users.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the set of users [K] to be players in a stochastic
game. The action space of each player j is the set ofM chan-
nels or arms Aj = [M ]. Let the time horizon be denoted by
T , and the action taken by player j at time t ≤ T be at,j . The
strategy at is defined as the vector of the actions taken by the
players, i.e., at = [at,1, ..., at,K ]. At any given time, players
can observe only their own rewards and cannot observe the
actions taken by other players.
In this model, we allow the number of players to be more
than the number of channels and the reward for each arm is
bounded in [0, 1]. Thus, in the event that more than one user
access the same armm, they would get non-zero rewards. Let
the reward obtained by player j at time t where the strategy
is at be denoted by rj(at,j , kt(at,j)), where kt(at,j) denotes
the number of users on the arm at,j . The mean reward for
player j for arm m with k(m) players on the arm is denoted
by µj(m, k(m)). The mean rewards are inversely propor-
tional to the number of users on that arm. We assume that
µj(m, k(m)) becomes negligible for some k(m) ≥ N + 1
where N depends on the system, i.e., µj(m, k(m)) = 0 for
k(m) ≥ N + 1. Thus the maximum number of players al-
lowed isMN
The action space for the players A is simply the product
space of the individual action spaces, i.e., A = ΠKj=1Aj . Let
a
∗ ∈ A be such that
a
∗ ∈ argmax
a∈A
K∑
j=1
µj(aj , k(aj))
In this work, we consider the case where there is a unique
optimal matching. Let J1 =
∑K
j=1 µj(a
∗
j , k(a
∗
j )) be the sys-
tem reward for the optimal matching and J2 the system re-
ward for the second optimal matching. In our algorithm we
assume that we have access to a lower bound on the value
∆ =
J1 − J2
2MN
The expected regret during a time horizon T is defined as:
R(T ) = T
K∑
j=1
µj(a
∗
j , k(a
∗
j ))−E

 T∑
t=1
K∑
j=1
µj(at,j , kt(at,j))


where the expectation is over the action profiles of the players.
We assume we have a lower bound on the parameter
νmin = min
j,m,n1,n2
|µj(m,n1)− µj(m,n2)|
where n1, n2 ∈ [N ], µj(m,n1), µj(m,n2) 6= 0, j ∈ [K]
and m ∈ [M ]. Since in our model we allow for more than
one user to occupy a channel with non-zero rewards, such a
parameter is needed for a user to learn with high probability
the number of users occupying the channel along with him
based on the reward he gets.
In addition, to estimate the means on each channel as a
function of the number of users, we need to impose some sep-
arability condition. We use the following separability condi-
tion considered in [1]:
|µj(m,n1)− µj(m,n2) ≥ 4Mc exp(
K − 1
M − 1
)
√
σ2 + ǫ2
where j ∈ [K], m ∈ [M ], n1, n2 ∈ [N ], ǫ2 ∈ (0, 1), σ
2
is the maximum variance of the reward distributions and c is
a constant.
3. ALGORITHM
In most models for uncoordinated spectrum access, one of
the main assumptions is that on collision, i.e., more than one
user accessing the same channel, the reward received by all
the users is zero. However this assumption is not a very real-
istic assumption since in such a situation, the colliding users
would get a reduced reward. Since there is no communication
possible between players, on receiving a lower reward than
expected, it is necessary to distinguish whether it is because
of other users accessing the same channel or because of the
stochastic nature of the rewards. Previous works such as [3]
and [10], use the method of forced collisions as a way for the
users to communicate their mean rewards to other players.
However, the method of forced collisions is not applicable in
this scenario due to the above mentioned reason. This work
is closest to [2] where they use a game-theoretic approach for
the users to take actions (choose arms) to maximise the sum
of utilities (mean rewards) of the players.
Our algorithm, summarized in Algorithm 1, proceeds in
epochs with each epoch having three phases. The first is the
exploration phase in which the players access the channels
uniformly in order to estimate the mean rewards of each chan-
nel as a function of the number of users occupying that chan-
nel via a clustering algorithm. In each epoch ℓ, the exploration
phase proceeds for T0 time units.
The second phase of the algorithm, summarized in Algo-
rithm 1, is a strategic form game where the goal is to maxi-
mize the utilities of the players. The dynamics in this phase
are adapted from [11], where they guarantee that the action
profile maximising the sum of utilities is played for a ma-
jority of the time. Each player j is associated with a state
[a¯j , u¯j, Sj ] where a¯j ∈ [M ] is the baseline action of the
player, u¯j ∈ [0, 1] is the baseline utility of the player and
Sj ∈ {C,D} is the mood of the player (C denotes content
and D denotes discontent). The utility of the player denotes
the mean reward of the user for the arm chosen as a function
of the number of users on the channel. This phase proceeds
in ’plays’, where each play lasts cǫ time units. In each play,
every player chooses an action depending on the mood and
baseline action and the arm chosen is played for cǫ time units.
The utility of the player for this play is determined according
to the mean of the rewards received in the play. The state of
the player is updated according to the action and utility in the
current play. In epoch ℓ, this phase proceeds for c2ℓ
1+δ plays
(c2cǫℓ
1+δ time units). Starting from d = ⌈ρc2ℓ
1+δ⌉-th play
of Algorithm 1, the number of times each action was played
that resulted in being content is counted by each user as
F ℓj (m) =
c2cǫℓ
1+δ∑
p=d
1{(ap,j=m,Sj=C)}
This maximising action profile is played for c32
ℓ time units
in the exploitation phase.
Theorem 1. Given the system model specified in Section 2,
the regret of the proposed algorithm for a time horizon T and
some 0 < δ < 1 is R(T ) = O(log2+δ T ).
Proof. Let LT be the last epoch with time horizon T . The
regret incurred during the LT epochs can be analysed as the
sum of the regret incurred in the three stages of the algorithm.
From the structure of the algorithm, we have thatLT < logT .
Let R1, R2 and R3 denote the regret incurred during the ex-
ploration phase, matching phase and exploitation phase dur-
ing LT epochs respectively.
1. Exploration phase: Since the exploration phase in each
epoch ℓ proceeds for T0 units
R1 ≤ T0LT ≤ T0 logT (1)
2. Matching phase: In epoch ℓ, the matching phase runs
for c2cǫℓ
1+δ time units. Thus
R2 =
LT∑
ℓ=1
c2cǫℓ
1+δ ≤ c2cǫL
2+δ
T ≤ c2cǫ log
2+δ T (2)
3. Exploitation phase: In the exploitation phase, regret is
incurred in the following two events:
(a) Let E1 denote the event that for some user j and
channel m and some k(m) ∈ [N ], we have that
|µj(m, k(m)) − µˆj(m, k(m))| ≥ ∆. Let proba-
bility of this event be P (E1)
(b) Let E2 denote the event that given that all users
have |µj(m, k(m))− µˆj(m, k(m))| ≤ ∆, the ac-
tion profile chosen in the matching phase of epoch
ℓ is not optimal. Let probability of this event for
some epoch ℓ be P ℓ(E2)
We have from Theorem 2 of [1] that by choosing an
appropriate T0, we have that P (E1) ≤ e
−ℓ and from
Lemma 3 that P ℓ(E2) ≤ Cρ exp (−ℓ
1+δ).
Therefore
R3 =
LT∑
ℓ=1
c32
ℓ(e−ℓ + Cρe
−ℓ1+δ)
≤
LT∑
ℓ=1
c3(1 + Cρ)(
2
e
)ℓ
≤
2c3(1 + Cρ)
2 + e
(3)
Thus
R(T ) = R1 +R2 +R3
≤ T0 logT + c2cǫ log
2+δ T +
2c3(1 + Cρ)
2 + e
= O(log2+δ T )
(4)
Algorithm 1:
Initialization: Set µˆj(m,n) = 0 for all j ∈ [K],
m ∈ [M ] and n ∈ [N ] and LT as the last epoch with
time horizon T
for ℓ = 1, ..., LT do
Exploration phase: for t = 0 to T0 do
Choose a channelm uniformly
Append reward to x(m)
µˆj(m, 1 : β)← Cluster x(m) for allm
Matching phase: Run Algorithm 2
Starting from d = ⌈ρc2ℓ
1+δ⌉-th turn of Algorithm
2, count the number of times each action was
played that resulted in being content
F ℓj (m) =
c2cǫℓ
1+δ∑
p=d
1{(ap,j=m,Sj=C)}
Exploitation phase: for c32
ℓ time units play
aj = argmax
m
F ℓj (m)
4. ESTIMATION PHASE
The exploration phase is required for each player to get es-
timates of the mean rewards of each channel as a function
of number of users on the channel. This phase is derived
from the estimation phase of [1]. While in [1], the cluster-
ing algorithm is done to estimate the means of each channel
when there is more than one user on the channel, Theorem 2
from [1] holds even if the clustering algorithm is carried out
to estimate the means from µj(m, 1) to µj(m,N). Thus by
selecting an appropriate T0, we have from Theorem 2 of [1]
that with probability 1− e−ℓ, we have
|µˆj(m, k(m))− µj(m, k(m))| ≤ ∆
for epoch ℓ. This allows us to find the optimal action profile
for the users using the estimates of the mean rewards, as we
have from Lemma 1 of [2] that if the above condition holds,
then the optimal action profile chosen according to the es-
timates is the same as the optimal action profile chosen ac-
cording to the actual mean rewards. While Lemma 1 of [2]
represents J2 in terms of the mean rewards and collision in-
dicators, it can be seen that the proof holds even when there
aren’t collision indicators present.
5. MATCHING PHASE
The aim of Algorithm 2 is for the players to settle on an action
profile that maximises the system reward. The utility of a
player j occupying channel aj with k(aj) players on it during
Algorithm 2:
Initialization: Let c > MN .
for t1 = 1, ..., c2ℓ
1+δ do
If Sj = C, action is chosen according to:
p
aj
j =
{
ǫc
M−1 , if aj 6= a¯j
1− ǫc, if aj = a¯j
(5)
If Sj = D, action is chosen according to:
p
aj
j =
1
M
∀ aj
Upon choosing an action aj , this arm is sampled
for cǫ time units and the average reward received
is r¯j .
Let
n∗ = argmin
n∈[β],µˆj(aj ,n) 6=0
|r¯j − µˆj(aj , n)|
The utility of the user is calculated as:
uj = µˆj(aj , n
∗)
The state of the user is updated as follows:
If Sj = C and [aj , uj ] = [a¯j , u¯j ], the new state is
the same as the previous
If Sj = C and [aj , uj ] 6= [a¯j , u¯j ] or Sj = D,
[a¯j , u¯j , C] =
{
[aj , uj , C] w.p. ǫ
1−uj
[aj , uj , D] w.p. 1− ǫ
1−uj
(6)
Algorithm 3: Cluster
Run an α-approximation for the k-means problem on
inputX , obtain β means ν1, ..., νβ
Sr ← {i : |xi − νr| ≤ |xi − νs|for everys}
Return g(Sr) =
1
|Sr|
∑
i∈Sr
xi
some play is defined as
u′j(a) = µˆj(aj , k(aj))
However, the player receives only the instantaneous reward
and do not know kt(at,j) in order to determine the util-
ity. Thus, in the matching phase algorithm, once the users
have chosen an action profile, they sample their chosen arms
for cǫ time units and the utility is calculated as the nearest
µˆj(m,n), n ∈ [β] to the sample mean.
Lemma 1. If cǫ ≥ ⌈
2 ln( 2
ǫc
)
(∆+νmin)2
⌉, we have that
pǫ = P (uj 6= u
′
j) ≤ ǫ
c
The proof follows directly from Hoeffding’s inequality.
The dynamics in the Matching Phase are adapted from
[11]. The dynamics induce a Markov chain over the state
space Z = ΠKj=1([M ]× [0, 1]×M)whereM = {C,D}. [11]
guarantees that during the matching phase, the action profile
achieving the optimal sum of utilities is played for a major-
ity of the time. The analysis of [11] relies on the theory of
resistance trees for regular perturbed Markov decision pro-
cesses [12]. The matching phase of our algorithm differs in
two aspects from [11]. The first is that our strategic form
game is not interdependent. This property is used in [11] only
to characterize the recurrence classes of the unperturbed pro-
cess (ǫ = 0). However, using the structure of our utilities, we
have the following lemma giving the same recurrence classes
as in [11].
Lemma 2. Let D0 represent the set of states in which every-
one is discontent. Let C0 represent the set of states in which
each agent is content and the benchmark action and utility
are aligned. Then the recurrence classes of the unperturbed
process are D0 and all singletons z ∈ C0 .
Proof. In the unperturbed process, if all the users are discon-
tent, they remain discontent with probability 1. Thus we have
that D0 represents a single recurrence class. In each state
z ∈ C0, each player chooses the same action and since the
baseline utility and utility are aligned, each user stays con-
tent with probability 1. Thus we have that D0 and singletons
z ∈ C0 are recurrence classes.
To see that the above are the only recurrence classes, look
at any state that has atleast one discontent user and atleast one
content user. We have that the baseline actions and utilities
of the content users are aligned (since this is the unperturbed
process). Consider one of the discontent users. This user
chooses an action at random and there is a positive probabil-
ity (bounded away from 0) of choosing the action of a con-
tent user. This would cause the utility of the content user to
become misaligned thus leading to that player becoming dis-
content. This continues until all players become discontent.
Thus any such state cannot be a recurrent state.
Now consider a state where all agents are content, but
there is atleast one user i whose benchmark action and util-
ity are not aligned. for the unperturbed process, in the fol-
lowing step, the same action profile would be played but this
would cause user i to become discontent and it follows from
the previous argument that this leads to all players becoming
discontent.
Thus we have thatD0 and all singletons inC0 are the only
recurrent states of the unperturbed process.
The second way in which our algorithm differs from [11]
is that there is a probability of error pǫ in calculating a user’s
utility. However, this can be represented as an ǫ perturbation
by rewriting the state update step as follows:
If the player is content:
If [aj , u
′
j] = [a¯j , u¯j ], the new state is
[a¯j , u¯j, C]→


[a¯j , u¯j , C] w.p. 1− pǫ
[a¯j , uj , C], w.p. pǫ(ǫ
1−uj )
[a¯j , uj , D], w.p. pǫ(1− ǫ
1−uj )
(7)
If [aj , u
′
j] 6= [a¯j , u¯j], with q < 1
[a¯j , u¯j , C]→


[a¯j , u¯j, C] w.p. qpǫ
[aj , uj, C], w.p. (1− qpǫ)(ǫ
1−uj )
[aj , uj, D], w.p. (1− qpǫ)(1 − ǫ
1−uj )
(8)
If player is discontent:
[a¯j , u¯j , D]→


[aj , uj, C] w.p. (1 − pǫ)ǫ
1−uj
[aj , uj, D], w.p. (1 − pǫ)(1 − ǫ
1−uj )
[aj , u
′
j, C], w.p. pǫǫ
1−u′j
[aj , u
′
j, D], w.p. pǫ(1− ǫ
1−u′j )
(9)
where we have from Lemma 1 that pǫ ≤ ǫ
c. The second
and third transitions when a player is content and [aj , u
′
j] =
[a¯j, u¯j ] correspond to the case when uj 6= u
′
j . Similarly when
the player is content, aj = a¯j and u
′
j 6= u¯j , there is a possi-
bility where u′j = u¯j and the probability of this is less than
pǫ. The transitions when the player is discontent can be inter-
preted similarly. Thus we can see that the unperturbed pro-
cess, i.e. when ǫ = 0, is the same as the unperturbed process
in [11]. And it can be verified that these dynamics satisfy
the conditions for a regular perturbed markov chain specified
in [12].
Let D be any state in D0 and z, z′ ∈ c0. It can be seen
that the resistances for the paths z → D, D → z amd z →
z′ are the same as in [11]. For instance, the transition from
z → D occurs only when a user experiments or the utility
is miscalculated. Since we have pǫ ≤ ǫ
c, the probability of
this event is O(ǫc) and hence the resistance of the transition
is c. Similarly it can be seen that the resistances for the path
D → z is (k −
∑
j∈[K] u¯j) and z → z
′ is bounded in [c.2c).
We have from the Lemma 2 that the recurrent classes of
the unperturbed process are the same as in [11] and the resis-
tances for the paths the same as in [11]. Thus from Theorem
1 of [11], we have that the stochastically stable state is the one
that maximises the sum of utilities of the players and by the
definition of a stochastically stable state, it is the one played
a majority of times in the matching phase. This is utilized by
the counting process done in the matching phase and the ac-
tion profile played the maximum number of times is played
in the exploitation phase. Thus with high probability, the ac-
tion profile maximising the sum of utilities is played in the
exploitation phase.
We bound the probability of the optimal action profile
not being played in the exploitation phase in the following
lemma.
Lemma 3. Let a∗ = argmax
a∈A
∑K
j=1 µj(aj , k(aj)) and
let a′ = [a′1, ..., a
′
K ] where a
′
j = argmaxm∈[M ] F
ℓ
j (m) at
some epoch ℓ. For small enough ǫ, in some epoch ℓ, P (a∗ 6=
a
′) ≤ Cρ exp (−ℓ
1+δ) for some Cρ > 0.
Proof. Let u¯ denote the utilities of the players for the opti-
mal action profile a∗. The optimal state of the markov chain
is then z∗ = [a∗, u¯, CK ]. Let the distribution of the markov
chain after the first d = ⌈ρc2ℓ
1+δ⌉ plays be φ. When the sys-
tem is in state z, let the observed state as seen by the users
be z′. The observed state would differ from the true state
only in the utilities, due to the possibility that some users
may calculate their utility functions incorrectly. The count-
ing process in the matching phase of some epoch ℓ is done for
L = ⌊c2(1 − ρ)ℓ
(1+δ)⌋. In order to bound the probability of
the event {a∗ 6= a′}, we use the Chernoff Hoeffding bounds
for markov chains from [13], which is also used in [2]. The
function f(z) considered here is
f(z) = 1{z=z∗,z′=z}
This is the event when the state is in the optimal state and the
state is also observed correctly (i.e. the utilities are observed
correctly by all users). If the optimal state is played for more
than L/2 plays and the utilities are calculated correctly by all
the users for these plays, then the optimal action profile would
be played in the exploitation phase. Thus we have that
P (a∗ 6= a′) ≤ P (
L∑
τ=1
f(z(τ))) ≤ L/2)
= P (
L∑
τ=1
1{z(τ)=z∗(τ),z′(τ)=z(τ)} ≤ L/2)
(10)
In order to use the bounds in [13], we need E [f(z)]. Thus
E [f(z)] = P (z = z∗, z′ = z)
= P (z = z∗)P (z′ = z|z = z∗)
(11)
We also have that
P (z′ 6= z|z = z∗) = P (∪j∈[M ]uj 6= u¯j)
≤
∑
j∈[M ]
P (uj 6= u¯j)
≤ Kǫc
(12)
This gives E [f(z)] = µf ≥ P (z = z
∗)(1 − Kǫc). And
from the definition of a stochastically stable state, we can
choose an ǫ small enough such that P (z = z∗)(1 −Kǫc) >
p > 1/2. Define η = 1 − 12µf so that 0 < η < 1 when
µf > 1/2. Let T be the 1/8 mixing time of the markov
chain. Thus from Theorem 3 of [13] we have that
P (
L∑
τ=1
f(z(τ)) ≤ L/2)
= P (
L∑
τ=1
f(z(τ)) ≤ (1− η)µfL)
≤ c0||φ||π exp(−
(1− 12µf )
2µfc2(1− ρ)ℓ
1+δ
72T
)
≤ Cρ exp (−ℓ
1+δ)
(13)
where
(1− 1
2µf
)2µf c2(1−ρ)
72T > 0 .
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